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ARGUMENT 
Appellees agreed to arbitrate this dispute: (1) in the Operating Agreement, 
as discussed in detail in the opening brief, and (2) when they agreed to have the 
arbitration award, with its express reservation of the determination of disputes 
arising in carrying out the winding up and distribution of partnership assets -
specifically the conveyance of properties - to the arbitration panel.1 
Appellee asks this Court to abandon the Utah Legislature's strong public 
policy in favor of arbitration, as expressed by the Utah Legislature in UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 78-31 a-101 to -131, See Bucknerv. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, If 16, 99 
P.3d 842, 847 ("The Utah legislature promotes alternative dispute resolution, 
including arbitration, because it 'reduce[s] the need for judicial resources and the 
time and expense of the parties.'") The Utah Supreme Court has itself recognized 
the strong public policy favoring arbitration. See id., at U 17 ("This court has also 
recognized the strong public policy favoring arbitration 'as an approved, practical, 
and inexpensive means of settling disputes and easing court congestion.'") 
The proffered especial circumstance for such abandonment of public policy 
argued by Appellee is the mere fact of judicial confirmation of an arbitration award 
entered between the parties some six years earlier. See Appellee's Brief at 4. 
Under Appellee's argued theory, the mere fact of confirmation by the Court 
1The confirmation was in fact effectuated upon stipulation of the parties. A 
copy of the Nielsen's Baseball Arbitration Proposal and the Stipulation to Confirm 
Arbitration Award, dated March 24, 2000, are attached as Appendix 1. 
1 
renders the agreements to arbitrate the disputes between the parties nugatory, as 
well as the confirmation order's own incorporation of the arbitration award's 
provision that the arbitration panel should reserve unto itself jurisdiction to resolve 
disputes concerning the carrying out of the partnership winding up and asset 
distribution. Appellees apparently posit that the policy of empowering courts to 
enforce their own judgments perse trumps the public policy favoring arbitration of 
disputes. 
Appellees' focus on the power of the courts to enforce their own judgments 
is somewhat of a red herring, however, because the arbitration award did not 
purport to effectuate the final winding up and distribution of partnership assets, 
but provided only a roadmap that the arbitration panel recognized would entail 
further disputes, to be resolved by the arbitration panel. Therefore, the 
"enforcement" of the confirmation order would require that the dispute currently 
existing would be sent back to the arbitration panel. According to the Utah 
Uniform Arbitration Act, the plain language of the arbitration award itself 
mandating arbitration, the plain language of the Operating Agreement mandating 
arbitration and the public policy favoring arbitration, the district court must not be 
allowed, and cannot be allowed, to adjudicate this dispute. 
The district court was correct when it recognized that "[t]he arbitration 
award is broad . . . . " R. 174. The district court erred, however, by failing to 
recognize that there was an agreement to arbitrate. When the district court 
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concluded that the arbitration award "does not constitute an agreement to 
arbitrate these issues[,]" it apparently overlooked the fact that the confirmation of 
the award by the court was upon stipulation, or in other words, by agreement, as 
to the term reserving jurisdiction to arbitrators. The district court further 
overlooked the plain language of the Operating Agreement, that makes arbitrable 
"[a]ny claim and disputes between the Members arising out of or related to this 
[Operating] Agreement...." R.24, 91. The distribution of partnership property 
upon dissolution plainly "aris[es] out of or relate[s] to" the Operating Agreement. 
The fact the neither the arbitration award nor the judicial confirmation thereof 
finally resolved all issues related to the partnership dissolution does not transform 
the arbitrable nature of such disputes into judicial controversies unrelated to the 
Operating Agreement. This dispute still concerns the distribution of partnership 
assets and remains subject to the broad language of the arbitration contract. 
While the arbitration award may not be a contract to arbitrate, the award's 
express admonition that the arbitration panel retain jurisdiction over certain 
issues, including the "conveyances of property," is in effect a determination by the 
arbitrators that such disputes are governed by the arbitration contract and that 
those disputes are arbitrable. The component of the award that Appellees ignore 
encouraging the parties to work out disputes that arise in the dissolution and 
distribution of the partnership assets and settlement of partnership affairs, and 
then to return to the arbitration panel if they could not be resolved, was an aspect 
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of the award that was not challenged by Appellees within the time limit to do so. 
Instead, Appellees stipulated to the award's confirmation. They should thus be 
irrevocably bound to the award's requirement to return to the arbitration panel 
over this very dispute.2 
I. APPELLEES AGREED TO HAVE THE FULL ARBITRATION PANEL HEAR THE 
DISPUTE WHEN THEY STIPULATED TO HAVE THE AWARD CONFIRMED. 
Appellees, on page 9 of their brief, argue that "The parties have only 
agreed to arbitrate 'claims and disputes arising out of or related to' the 
Company's Operating Agreement [emphasis added.]" That argument ignores the 
fact that confirmation of the award, in its entirety, was based on an agreement 
between the parties- the confirmation order was expressly based on "the 
stipulation entered into by and between MacDonald Redhawk Investors, 
Redhawk Development LLC, and Nielsen Redhawk LLC," R. 124 (Order 
Confirming Arbitration Award). 
That agreement to have the award confirmed, in its entirety and without 
challenge, is plainly an agreement to the retention of arbitrators' jurisdiction over 
this very dispute, retention of jurisdiction that the now-confirmed arbitration award 
requires. The arbitration award, confirmed by Appellees' agreement, states: "3. 
The Arbitration Panel should retain junsdiction over the conveyances of 
properties, assumption of debt, assignment of water rights, granting 
2 
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reciprocal easements and the like, subject to the prior efforts of the parties to 
first mutually consent and agree, which is to be encouraged." R. 60 (emphasis 
added). Rather than agreeing to this provision, Appellees could have challenged 
the award within the appropriate time limit as insufficiently definite and final. They 
could have argued at the time that the reserved disputes would not be subject to 
further arbitration, but elected not to do so. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31 a-
121(1)(b).3 
Having agreed to the confirmation of this provision of the award through the 
stipulation to confirm the entire award, there is in fact an agreement for retention 
of jurisdiction by the panel of arbitrators. Appellees' contention that there is no 
agreement cannot stand in the face of their stipulation to have this provision for 
arbitration of this very nature of dispute confirmed. 
II. THE DISPUTE IN THIS CASE, ABOUT THE DISTRIBUTION OF PARTNERSHIP 
ASSETS, Is ARBITRABLE, EVEN IF ONE IGNORES THE AGREEMENT TO CONFIRM 
THE PROVISION OF THE AWARD To RESERVE JURISDICTION To THE 
ARBITRATION PANEL OVER THE DISPUTE. 
Appellees cite a case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, San Francisco Electrical Contractors Association, Inc. v. International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 577 F.2d 529, 534 (9th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter, 
3UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31-13(13) (2001), which is the version of the Utah 
Uniform Arbitration Act that was in effect at the time of the entry of the award, 
afforded essentially the same possibility for Appellees to obtain relief from an 
award that was insufficiently definite and final, allowing an award to be modified if 
it was "imperfect as to form .. . ." 
5 
"SFECA"], as support for their position that this dispute is not arbitrable for no 
reason other than a confirmation of the award has been entered. See Appellees' 
Brief, at 9-10. 
The question presented to the court in SFECA was not the question before 
this Court. Rather, the question in SFECA was whether an injunction, prohibiting 
a union from striking, violated the NORRIS-LAGUARDIAACT, 29 U.S.C. § 104, or 
whether the injunction served to enforce a prior arbitration award, and therefore 
fell within an exception to the ACT. See SFECA, 577 F.2d at 530. 
The case before this Court presents neither the imminency of a labor action 
nor the need for interpreting the NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT concerning the 
availability of injunctions against labor strikes. The reason that an anti-strike 
injunction was proper in SFECA was rooted in the district court's finding that the 
defendant union, in opposing the injunction against the strike, was merely 
seeking to revisit the existing arbitration award's determination that there was no 
violation of the collective bargaining agreement: 
The district court found: 
"12. There was before the arbitrator the specific question as to 
whether the installation of a complete Electro-Connect system 
was a violation of the collective bargaining agreement, and 
what defendant seeks herein to do is to take a portion of that 
installation and again engage in said grievance procedure 
despite the fact that the portion is part of the whole system, 
which point was fully discussed in its entirety before said 
arbitrator." 
Id. at 534. Having found that the issue had already been arbitrated, the injunction 
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fell within an exception to the ACT. 
The dispute here is not, as the district court found in SFECA, a revisiting of 
the arbitration. The arbitration award in this case plainly states: 
As we were never permitted to have access to the map 
making technology that MacDonald used, we were reduced to 
an old masterplan and colored pencils. On the attached 
Exhibit "A," we have tried to represent our proposal in a visual 
aid. It assumes that the unrecorded lots in Plats E and F will 
likely be redesigned and the roads relocated to make the 
concept of two distinct projects more feasible and the layout 
more functional. 
R. 54 n.3. The colored pencil "visual aid" attached as Exhibit "A" thereto plainly 
divides down the middle one of the lots that Appellees now argue the award 
grants to them. R. 50. The arbitration award also plainly awards "Nielsen" 
"697.55 acres of property". R. 54.4 Mr. Nielsen set forth in his affidavit that the 
deeds sought by Appellees would not leave him with the acreage that the award 
granted him. R. 34 at U 7. While Appellees argue that the discussion of the 
Chudleigh and Romney appraisals in the arbitration award, at R. 55-56, somehow 
alters the plain award of acreage to Nielsen, or negates the required division of 
the lot in the colored pencil as shown in R. 50, it is clear that the ultimate award 
was based on acreage, not just lot numbers. 
4Appellees have attempted to distort the award by suggesting that it 
awarded specific lots to "Nielsen." A reading of the entire award shows that such 
contention is plainly false, as the award unquestionably awards acreage and 
attempts to estimate the partition of such acreage with the colored-pencil map. 
That map plainly divides a lot and shows part of it going to "Nielsen," while 
appellees argue that they deserve a deed to the entire lot. See Point IV, below. 
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The award also clearly left the resolution of its fulfillment with the arbitration 
panel, as expressly set out in the award: 
3. The Arbitration Panel should retain jurisdiction over the 
conveyances of properties, assumption of debt, assignment 
of water rights, granting reciprocal easements and the like, 
subject to the prior efforts of the parties to first mutually 
consent and agree, which is to be encouraged. 
4. A land bank of 100 acres (40 beneficially owned by 
Nielsen and 60 beneficially owned by MacDonald) should 
be established with corresponding deeds placed in 
escrow to deal with the assumption of unsecured debt 
and similar performance issues. This would work to 
secure each parties promised assumption of unsecured 
debts and other obligations, so that if one party does not 
timely perform, the other could perform instead and 
receive a greater share in the land bank. The parties should 
be able to agree on a per acre valuation to make the land bank 
concept work. Failing that, the Panel could determine an 
appropriate value. 
R. 60 (emphasis added). The parties in fact proceeded, post-award confirmation, 
in accordance with the language of the award, to attempt to resolve most of the 
remaining differences between them, using one of the arbitrators as a mediator. 
See, e.g., R. 40-48. 
When there was no final agreement to have a single arbitrator decide the 
final remaining issues them, however, Appellees, rather than going back to the 
full panel as required by the arbitration award and the court's order confirming 
that award, filed this litigation. That is something neither the Operating 
Agreement, the confirmation order nor the arbitration award allows. 
Appellees dispute that the award, which was drafted by Mr. Nielsen's 
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attorneys, means what it says about acreage. The fact that Appellees argue in 
this litigation for adoption of their proffered meaning of the award does not 
transform the dispute from being one about dissolution of the Partnership and 
distribution of Partnership assets and thereby one arising out of or related to the 
Partnership Agreement, into something else. The fact that the court confirmed 
the award does not mean that Appellees may ignore paragraph 3 of the 
confirmed award, which reserves to the arbitration panel jurisdiction over the 
"conveyances of properties," but instead requires that this court's confirmation 
order, agreed to by Appellees, be enforced, by sending the dispute back to the 
arbitration panel. SFECA is thus utterly distinguishable on its facts as well as on 
the legal issue before the court, from this case. 
Appellees also cite the case of Staniszewski v. Grand Rapids Packaging 
Corp., 125 Mich. App. 97, 336 N.W.2d 10 (1983). It first bears mentioning that, 
as to the point for which Appellees cite Staniszewski, Staniszewski itself cites 
only SFECA. See Staniszewski, 336 N.W.2d at 11. So Staniszewski really does 
not shed any additional light on the issue beyond what SFECA did. 
Moreover, the procedural posture of Staniszewski is completely inapposite. 
There was no issue before the court in Staniszewski of whether the dispute was 
arbitrable and therefore should be sent to mandatory arbitration. Apparently, the 
defendant, if the dispute was arbitrable, chose to waive its right to compel 
arbitration. Instead, the trial court in Staniszewski took evidence, including 
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evidence from the arbitrator, to determine whether the "back pay" awarded in the 
arbitration should be calculated on a standard, 40-hour work week, or the 52-hour 
work week that the plaintiff actually worked. 336 N.W.2d at 10-11. The arbitrator 
testified that he was unaware of plaintiff's atypical work hours but that, if he had 
know of that fact, he would have made the back pay award include sums based 
on a 52-hour work week. See id. at 11. The appellate court held that such a 
proceeding, to clarify the award, "did not exceed the very limited scope of judicial 
review of arbitration awards . . . ." Id. The Staniszewski case thus had nothing at 
all to do with the issue in this case - whether the dispute is subject to mandatory 
arbitration. 
While courts must certainly have the power to enforce their judgments, it 
would be a grave reversal of the public policy of this state favoring arbitration, to 
allow a court to adjudicate clearly arbitrable issues in the guise of an enforcement 
proceeding. Such a result would be particularly perverse when the confirmation 
order sought to be enforced, itself, mandates a return of the disputes to an 
arbitration panel. Whether "Nielsen" is entitled to a distribution from the 
Partnership of the acreage that the award grants him, and the portion of the lot 
that the attachment to the award, R. 50, shows as divided, or whether Appellees 
are entitled to the lots they seek, without regard to acreage, is an arbitrable 
dispute within the meaning of the arbitration award that Appellees stipulated to 
have confirmed, as well as the Operating Agreement.. One may take issue with 
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the form the arbitrators chose to make their award, but any disputes in the 
winding up of the partnership and distribution of assets in furtherance of the 
award are to be resolved in arbitration. Nowhere did the parties agree to exempt 
from their broad mandatory arbitration clause or the award's requirement, 
confirmed by the parties' agreement, that disputes be returned to arbitration, 
disputes that arose during the process of Partnership dissolution, winding up and 
distribution of assets contemplated by the arbitration award, simply due to inartful 
resolution by the arbitrators. 
"The propriety of remanding an ambiguous award to the arbitrator is 
reenforced by the strong federal policy favoring arbitration." M &C Corp. v. Erwin 
Behr GmbH <& Co., KG, 326 F.3d 772, 782 (6th Cir. 2003). M&C Corp. cites 
other decisions from the Sixth Circuit, as well as decisions from the United States 
Courts of Appeal for the Second, Third and Seventh Circuits, favoring remand to 
the arbitrators for determination of the meaning of ambiguous awards. See id. 
(citing Americas Insurance Co. v. Seagull Compania Naviera, S.A., 114 F.2d 64, 
67 (2d Cir.1985) "('An ambiguous award should be remanded to the arbitrators so 
that the court will know exactly what it is being asked to enforce.')"; Mutual Fire, 
Marine & Inland Ins. Co. v. Norad Reinsurance Co., 868 F.2d 52, 58 (3d Cir. 
1989) "('A district court itself should not clarify an ambiguous arbitration award but 
should remand it to the arbitration panel for clarification.')"; and Tri-State Bus. 
Mach., Inc. v. Lanier Worldwide, Inc., 221 F.3d 1015,1020 (7th Cir.2000) 
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"(reversing and remanding order executing post-arbitration judgment where 
district court erred in not remanding the ambiguous award to arbitration panel for 
clarification)"). 
The strong public policy favoring arbitration in Utah is, likewise, furthered 
by having arbitrable issues arbitrated, rather than being decided by courts, even 
post-confirmation. To some degree, the recent decision of the Utah Supreme 
Court in Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, U 16, 99 P.3d 842, rested on just such 
principles. In Buckner, the plaintiffs obtained offensive preclusive effect in the 
district court with respect to a prior arbitration award against defendant. See id. 
U 11, at 846. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the offensive use of 
preclusive effect by non-parties to an arbitration, unlike the litigation equivalent, 
was contrary to the strong public policy favoring arbitration and therefore, unless 
expressly allowed in the arbitration contract, not allowable. See id. ffll 16-18, 29, 
at 847-48, 850. The Court's rationale was premised largely on the uncertainty 
that would obtain in such circumstances, which uncertainty might discourage the 
use of arbitration agreements. To no lesser extent, the uncertainty of having a 
second tribunal interpret the inartful rulings of an arbitration panel might 
discourage the use of arbitration agreements. Why spend the money to arbitrate, 
only to receive an award that, due to the informal nature of arbitration, leaves a 
dispute that a court will then resolve? Clearly, the purpose of arbitration is served 
by having the arbitrators answer those questions, not by allowing litigation of 
12 
those arbitrable issues. 
III. THE DECISION OF THE SINGLE ARBITRATOR THAT HE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO 
Do MORE WAS CORRECT- ONLY THE FULL ARBITRATION PANEL COULD 
FURTHER CONTINUE THE ARBITRATION WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE 
PARTIES TO THE CONTRARY. 
Appellees attempt to support their argument that the present dispute is not 
arbitrable not only by reference to judicial confirmation of the award, but also by 
reference to a single member of the arbitration panel's ruling that he was unable 
to proceed, absent agreement of the parties, to arbitrate the remaining disputes. 
Such ruling by the single arbitrator was manifestly correct, as the arbitration was 
to three, not one, arbitrators. While Appellants had offered to have the single 
member of the panel arbitrate all remaining disputes except for valuation of real 
property, which they offered to have arbitrated by the sole real estate appraiser 
on the panel, Appellees refused to have an arbitration go forward in that fashion. 
That does not mean that the sole arbitrator's recognition that he could not 
proceed without further agreement altered the award's express reservation to the 
entire panel of jurisdiction. To the contrary, a single arbitrator could not possibly 
overrule an existing arbitration award entered by a panel of three arbitrators. 
In short, the sole arbitrator's order does not serve as recognition of any 
ruling that the dispute is not arbitrable, except insofar as Appellants desired 
something other than a full panel of arbitrators. Indeed, although Appellees try to 
distort Mr. Holbrook's ruling as applicable to the continuing jurisdiction reserved 
to the entire panel, Mr. Holbrook's Order, which dealt strictly with his own inability 
13 
to arbitrate and, therefore, the requirement that he release funds that had been 
paid into escrow in anticipation of such an arbitration, says no such thing. 
Instead, Mr. Holbrook's references are each carefully tailored to note that no 
agreement had been entered to submit issues to "me" to be arbitrated, so he 
could not longer maintain the escrowed funds held by him pursuant to a post-
confirmation side agreement. See R. 73-74. Contrary to Appellant's argument, 
Mr. Holbrook did not "suggest" that Appellees file suit in district court or that the 
dispute was not arbitrable. 
The alternative was not, as elected by Appellees, to file an action in court 
over clearly arbitrable issues, but instead, to go back to the panel, as the 
confirmed award required, or to file a new arbitration proceeding, as the 
arbitration agreement allowed. 
IV. APPELLEES' MISSTATEMENTS CONCERNING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE 
ARBITRATION AWARD DO NOT EARN THEM THE RIGHT TO AVOID ARBITRATING 
THE DISPUTE THEY CREATE. 
Appellees continuously ignore the material portions of the arbitration 
award, in favor of their mischaracterization that the award is nothing but the 
Chudleigh analysis of particular lots. Appellees, for example, state: "Thus, the 
Nielsen Redhawk proposal, based on the Chudleigh valuation and division of the 
property by whole lots, was adopted by the arbitration panel in its entirety and 
without any modifications." Appellees' Brief, at 4. The misleading falsehood in 
that "fact" is that the Nielsen Baseball proposal was the equivalent of the 
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Chudleigh analysis. Although Mr. Nielsen based his proposal in large measure 
on the Chudleigh analysis, as arbitration award itself plainly states, Mr. Nielsen 
was not to receive lots, regardless of acreage, but rather was to receive "697.55 
acres." R. 54. Mr. Nielsen's affidavit established that the deeds Appellees seek 
would leave him short approximately 20 acres from what the arbitration award 
awarded him in acreage. The discussion of Chudleigh's proposal in the award 
does not specify, as the award does at R. 54, any number of acres going to Mr. 
Nielsen. Further, Appellants simply ignore the colored pencil approximation of 
the result of the award, R. 50, that shows one of the lots that Appellants seek to 
obtain in its entirety as going to half to Nielsen. Finally, Appellees' distortion 
ignore the award's mandate that the "conveyances of property" would remain 
within the jurisdiction of the arbitration panel. R. 60. All of these specific 
components of the award are ignored by Appellees because, if they were candid 
about them, their premise concerning the lot division by Chudleigh would be 
exposed for the falsehood it is. 
In short, the arbitration panel recognized that much remained to do before 
properties were conveyed and that certain assumptions were being made which, 
if they later turned out to be incorrect, might necessitate adjustments on the 
conveyances of property. So jurisdiction was retained. To suggest that a court 
might now adequately interpret the vagaries of the award without a full-blown 
litigation, that the arbitration agreement prohibits, is simply not forthcoming. The 
15 
dispute was arbitrable, it remains arbitrable, and arbitrators, not the court, should 
be sorting out the remaining issues of this complex partnership dissolution. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's denial of Appellants' motion 
to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings should be reversed, and the dispute 
over conveyances of property sent to arbitration. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this to" _ day of June, 2006. 
PETERS SCOFIELD PRICE 
Professional Corporation 
DAVID W. SCOFIELDX 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that two true and correct copies of the 
above and foregoing Reply Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, this J2--Q 
day of June, 2006, to the following: 
James S. Lowrie 
R. L. Knuth 
Ryan M. Harris 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH, P.C 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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APPENDIX 1 
HOLME ROBERTS &OWEN, UP 
Robert L. Stolebarger (USB# 3123) 
E. Blaine Rawson (USB# 7289) 
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-5800 
Facsimile: (801) 521-9639 
Attorneys for Nielsen Redhawk, LLC 
BEFORE THE ARBITRATION PANEL 
MACDONALD REDHAWK INVESTORS, 
a Utah limited partnership, ] 
Plaintiff ] 
v. ] 
NIELSEN REDHAWK, LLC, a Utah ] 
limited liability company, and REDHAWK ) 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Utah limited ) 
company, ) 
Defendants. ] 
1 NIELSEN'S BASEBALL 
> ARBITRATION PROPOSAL 
i Arbitration Panel: 
1 James R Holbrook, Esq., Chair 
1 Alan V. Funk, CPA 
J. Philip Cook, MAI 
Nielsen Redhawk, LLC ("Nielsen11), by and through its counsel, respectfully submits its 
Baseball Arbitration Proposal on the partition of the property and allocation of the related debt. 
miROPTJCTION 
It should be first said that we understand and accept the wisdom of the Arbitration 
Panel's ruling. Under the circumstances, a partition of the subject real property makes the most 
practical sense, and an allocation to Nielsen and MacDonald Redhawk Investors ("MacDonald") 
of 40% and 60%* respectively of net (after debt) property value is an appropriate and fair 
accounting of their interests. 
This ratio has been rounded from the interests amounts of $3,797,155 as determined for Nielsen 




Our task is to implement the Panel's decision in the spirit it was reached, and we have 
endeavored to do just that. 
We considered simply allocating 40% to Nielsen and 60% to MacDonald of each and 
every plat with the related debt. This approach would avoid the potential that either party may 
capture a windfall from a favorable sale, e.g. a possible sale to Grayhawk, of a single plat or 
group of plats. The Utah Supreme Court recognized the merit of this approach in cases where 
there is an economic disparity in prospects for different parcels. See, Gillmor v. Gillmor, 657 
P.2d 736 (Utah 1982). While this approach would seem fair, it unfortunately will not work for 
the same practical reasons that persuaded the Panel to order a partition in the first place. 
Instead, we make a proposal that takes account of practical considerations, including the 
debt structure, the existing creditor-debtor relationships, the potential seller-buyer relationships 
and a feasible design for two separate projects. The proposal fits the determined 40 - 60 ratio 
under both Mr. Chudleigh's f,as-is,f appraisal values and Mi. Romney's "as-is" appraisal values. 
If accepted by the Panel, our proposal will result in an allocation of property value and debt2 that 
allocates a substantial portion of Sections 6&7 and the related debt (697.55 acres of property 
with debt of $4,880,396.89) to Nielsen and the remaining portion of Sections 6&7 and all of 
Sections 5&8 and the related debt (762.16 acres of property with debt of $4,540,571,43) to 
MacDonald, all as follows:3 
Under our proposal the unsecured debt would also be aUocated 40% to Nielsen and 60% to 
MacDonald. 
3
 As we were never permitted to have access to the map making technology that MacDonald used, 
we were reduced to an old masteiplan and colored pencils. On the attached Exhibit WA,W we have tried to represent 
our proposal in a visual aid. It assumes that the unrecorded lots in Plats E and F will likely be redesigned and the 




Using Mr. Chudleigh's " As-Is" Appraisal Values 
Allocated to Nielsen: 
Property Allocation (total of 39 lots): 
Plat A (18 lots) - 4, 5,9,11,14,16, 22, 25, 26, 30,31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 
Plat F (21 lots) - 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 
97, 98, 99, 100 
Property Value: $9,430,000" 
Secured Debt: 
Beehive Credit Union $1,874,165.73 
Westside Canadian $1,586,402.30 
ZionsBank 423,101.25 
Key Bank 537,770.55 
Cape Trust 458.957.06 
Total $4,880,396.89 
Nielsen's Net (After Debt) Value: $4,549,603 (40% of total net value) 
Allocated to MacDonald: 
Property Allocation (total of 44 lots): 
Plat B (14 lots) - 41,42,43,44,45,46,49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57 
Plat C (3 lots) - 58, 59, 60 
Plat D (8 lots) - 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69 
PlatE(12lots)- 108,109,110, 111, 112,113,114, 115,116, 117,118,119 
Plat F (7 lots) - 78, 101,102, 103, 104,105,107 




(less note payable assigned to G/G) (632.646.00) 
Total $4,540,571.43 
MacDonald's Net (After Debt) Value: $6,799,429 (60% of total net value) 
Based upon Mr. Chudleigh's November 22,1999 work sheets, which were previously forwarded 
to Phil Cook and are attached as Exhibif'B." 
*77795v2 -
0UU0^5 
Using Mr. Romney's "As-Is" Appraisal Values 
Allocated to Nielsen: 
Property Allocation (total of 18 lots and 53% of Plats E&F): 
Plat A (18 lots or 343.44 acres) - 4,5,9,11,14,16,22,25,26,30,31,32,34,35,36, 
37, 38,39 
Plats E&F (53% of 668.13 acres) - 354.11 acres 
Property Value: $6,282,165 
Plat A - $3,627,757 (343.44 acres x $ 10,563/acre - see Letter Addendum No.2, p. 3) 
Plat E&F - $ 2,650,558 (354.11 x $7,496/acre - see Letter Addendum No.2, p. 3) 
Secured Debt: 
Beehive Credit Union $1,874,165.73 
Westside Canadian 1,586.402.30 
Zions Bank 423,101.25 
Key Bank 537,770.55 
Cape Trust 458.957.06 
Total $4,880,396.89 
Net Value: $1,401,768 (40% of total net value) 
Allocated to MacDonald: 
Property Allocation (total of 44 lots): 
Plat B (14 lots or 189.23 acres) - 41,42,43,44,45,46,49,51,52, 53, 54, 55,56,57 
Plat C (3 lots or 125.29 acres) - 58, 59, 60 
Plat D (133.62 acres) - 62,63, 64, 65, 66,61,68, 69 
Plat E&F (47% of 668.13 acres) - 314.02 acres 
Property Value: $6,677,783 
PlatB - $1,998,836 (189.23 acresx$10,563/acre-.se<? Letter Addendum No.2, p. 3) 
Plat C - $1,323,438 (125.29 acres x $ 10,563/acre - see Letter Addendum No.2, p. 3) 
Plat D - $1,001,615 (133.62 x $7,496/acre - see Letter Addendum No. 2, p. 3) 




(less note payable assigned to G/G) C632.646.00) 
Total $4,540,571.43 
Net Value: $2,137,212 (60% of total net value) 
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Perhaps the Panel already knew, or at least suspected, that the use of a ratio would avoid the 
disparity between the Chudleigh and Romney "as-is" appraisals. It clearly does, as the allocation 
results using both approaches are essentially identical.5 We submit our proposal as a fair and 
practical allocation of property and debt that is sensitive to existing creditor-debtor relationships and 
potential seller-buyer relationships, as well as good project design that will allow each party to end 
up with two whole projects rather than two halves of one project. 
COMPARISON WITH MACDONALD APPROACH 
Nielsen and MacDonald agree that Nielsen should receive all of Plat A in Sections 6 and 7 
and a portion of Plat F in Section 6 and that MacDonald should receive the remainder of Plat F in 
Section 6 and all of Plats B, C, D and E in Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8. The issue that keeps them apart 
is how much of Plat F in Section 6 each should receive. Nielsen believes he should receive 
approximately 354 acres with total debt allocation of $4,880,396.89. MacDonald believes Nielsen 
should receive significantly less acreage and slightly less debt. 
While we do not know what MacDonald's exact proposal to the Panel will be, we assume 
it will be based on the methodologies that he and his advisors have employed in our discussions. 
These methodologies include a hybrid of "retail" and "as-is" assumptions determined by Mr. 
Romney, as reflected in his Letter Addendum No. 2, at p.2, in his appraisal report (Claimant's 
Exhibit Tab 22). Mr. Romney uses "retail" values for Plats A, B and C and "as-is" values for Plats 
D, E and F. MacDonald may increase the "as-is" value for Plat D lots to $12,000, as has been 
discussed, to reflect an increased value arising ficom speculation concerning Grayhawk's interest in 
that area. The effect of this approach is to create a significant disparity in value between Plats A, 
Mr. Romney does not break-out individual lots in Plats E & F, as the lots are unrecorded. 
Instead, Mr. Romney uses the total acreage of 668.13. For comparison, 53% of the total number of unrecorded lots 
(i.e., 40 lots) in Plats E & F would be 21 lots, and 47% would be 19 lots, the exact same numbers of lots allocated to 
Nielsen and MacDonald, respectively, under Mr. Chudleigh's valuation. 
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B, C, and D acreage and Plats E and F acreage. On average, this disparity is three times greater 
using the hybrid approach than it is under either Mr. Chudleigh's or Mr. Romney* s "as-isff 
approaches. This tends to frontload value in Plats A, B and C that is to then be adjusted back to the 
desired ratios by allocating more of the lower valued property in Plats D, E and F to MacDonald.6 
The other methodology that MacDonald may employ is a variation on Mr. Romney's ,!as-is" 
appraisal values. Mr. Romney breaks out values for Plats A, B, C, D, E and F and then ratchets-up 
those values by a multiplier of something near 1.5 to produce total after debt value of $9,627,664 
(the combined total of Nielsen's $3,797,155 interest and MacDonald's $5,830,509 (see fii. 1)). The 
primaiy problem with this approach is the absorption assumptions made in support of the Plat A, B 
and C values. Mr. Romney places a significantly higher value on Plat A lots than Plat B lots and 
a significantly higher value on Plat B lots than Plat C, because he assumes sales will be completed 
in Plat A before they are started in Plat B and completed in Plat B before they are started in Plat C. 
This assumption may have made some sense when it was made in the context of a single proj ect, but 
it would make no sense in the context of two separate projects. MacDonald is under no obligation 
to wait to market Plat B or Plat C lots until Nielsen completes the marketing of Plat A lots. In light 
of this, the average per acre price for Plats A, B and C, as determined by Mr. Romney, is a much 
better indicator of value (see Mr. Romney's Letter Addendum No. 2, at p. 3). This is the number 
we used in our fTJsing Mr. Romney's *As-Is' Appraisal Values" section.7 
It is also worth, mentioning that the total net after debt value under the hybrid approach is 
considerably greater than that advocated by MacDonald in the hearing. In fact, the net value of $ 11,069,603 
exceeds the $9,627,664 total for Nielsen's and MacDonald's interests (see fh.l). We would submit that if the Panel 
is tempted to use that value for any reason, it should consider applying the equity interest fractions, 60% to Nielsen 
and 40% to MacDonald, to the excess of 51,441,939. 
7
 It should also be noted that Mr. Chudleigh saw this problem in preparing his November 22,1999 
worksheets. Mr. Chudleigh does two separate discounted cash flows, one for each project This has the effect of 
creating two separate absorption periods, with the expectation that the respective sales efforts will be concurrent 
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OTHER FACTORS TO CONSIDER 
There is a qualitative difference between the debt that Nielsen assumes under this 
proposal and the debt assumed by MacDonald; differences that cut both ways. 
MacDonald is assuming the Redhawk Investors (or Gaskill and Gillette) debt and the 
Redenbaugh debt, both of which are in default. It might be argued that MacDonald should 
receive some kind of special dispensation for that. We do not think so. Please keep in mind the 
level of MacDonald's sophistication and his bent for calculation, both clear from the evidence 
that both sides submitted. Does anyone really believe that MacDonald seeks out Sections 5 and 
8 and the related debt because he feels that is his cross to bear? No. MacDonald sees an 
advantage to taking Sections 5 and 8 and the related debt. The debt is not institutional debt. It 
can be paid in lots rather than cash, or, as MacDonald had previously discussed, at least the 
Redenbaugh debt may be converted to equity. Last, but certainly not least, it cannot be disputed 
that Grayhawk is interested in acquiring or joint venturing the Section 8 property, and perhaps 
more. 
It may be said that Nielsen is getting the good debt owed to Robinson/Westside 
Canadian, which carries only a 5% interest rate. This is true, but in fairness, it should be noted 
that the Robinson debt is due in less than a year, making refinancing a necessity, and Nielsen is 
also assuming the Beehive Credit Union debt, among others. 
CONCLUSION 
We believe our proposal is fair and practical. To make it even better and to give Nielsen 
and MacDonald a genuine chance to get on with their lives and projects in a constructive and 
mutually beneficial fashion, Nielsen will agree, if the Panel selects its proposal, to enter a 
mutual, global release of all claims with MacDonald. 
#77795 v2 
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Nielsen suggests8 the following in addition: 
1. To ensure a clean break and to avoid public confusion, neither party should use 
the word "Redhawk" in its future project names or marketing materials. The entities names 
should be changed accordingly. 
2. To the fullest extent possible, both parties should agree to reciprocal, non-
disparagement of the other. 
3. The Arbitration Panel should retain jurisdiction over the conveyances of 
properties, assumption of debt, assignment of water rights, granting reciprocal easements and the 
like, subject to the prior efforts of the parties to first mutually consent and agree, which is to be 
encouraged. 
4. A land bank of 100 acres (40 beneficially owned by Nielsen and 60 beneficially 
owned by MacDonald) should be established with corresponding deeds placed in escrow to deal 
with the assumption of unsecured debt and similar performance issues. This would work to 
secure each parties promised assumption of unsecured debts and other obligations, so that if one 
party does not timely perform, the other could perform instead and receive a greater share in the 
land bank. The parties should be able to agree on a per acre valuation to make the land bank 
concept work. Failing that, the Panel could determine an appropriate value. 
Submitted this day of December, 1999. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
By._ 
x
 Robert L. Stoleb^er 
Attorney for Nieliej)Redhawk LLC 





CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 0 day of December, 1999,1 caused to be hand-delivered, 
the foregoing BASEBALL ARBITRATION PROPOSAL to the following: 
Thomas T. Billings 
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Facsimile: (801) 534-0058 
STEVEN G. WOOD (C.A.S.B.N. 130050) 
c/o Thomas T. Billings 
The Downing House 
706 Cowper Street, Suite 200 
Palo Alto, CA 94301 
Telephone: (650) 473-0395 
Facsimile: (650) 473-0535 
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Walt Chudleigh (435-649-5906) 
10- including thi$ cover sheet. 
11/22/99 
Notes on Partition DCF Analyses 
Assumptions: 
Lots are divided based on the cblor coded-map. 
Construction costs are based oi the Beco estimates used in the Chudleigh appraisals 
Costs for the road extending northeasterly between Plats E and F are allocated on a 50-50 basis 
based on the lineal footage. S5(P0,000 of the Plat F costs are allocated to the MacDonald lots and 
the balance to the Nielsen lots. I 
A loan to value ratio of approximately 38% is used in both projections for consistency. 
Lot values axe based on the same values used in the Chudleigh reports. 
AH of the other assumptions am identical to those found in the Chudleigh appraisal. 
Walt 
From the desk of... 
Summary of Assumptions 
Redhawk- Nielsen Lots 
No. of Lots 39 
No, Periods/Year 4 
[Average base price/lot $377,500 
Sale Commission & Promotion % 7.00% 
Hosing cost per lot $250 
periods unlit Sellout 13 
RETax/loUyear $10 
Common charges/lol/year $1,200 
Tax Rollback per Lot $10,500 
Developer's Overhead % 1.00% 
Original Loan $3,600,000 
Annua] interest rate B.500% 
Release % 90.00% 
Developer's Profit 12,00% 
Discount Rate 12.00% 
jAnnual Appreciation rale 3,00% 
Periods delay 
Prior to appreciation 2 
.ypense Inflation Rale. (Aop)^ .3.00% 
|Tax Inflation Rale 
Original Mortgage Balance: 
Mortgage Balance Per Lot; 
Release Percent: 
[Release Price Per Lot: 







Discounted Cash Flow Analysis 
Appreciation Rate: 
LoU Completed 
Cureolaife* Lot* Completed 
Awage Lot Pilce: 
Sties pefBwtod 
fiutwbilv* Lots Sold: 
'-vsold Inventory: 













Assumed Loan Draw. 
^Net Revenue Before Release: 
^asn Row Before Release: 
Release Payment: 
Cash Flow After Release: 
Developer's Profit: 
CP After Devel Profit: 
Mortgage Schedule; 
Beginning Mortgage Balance: 
Interest Expense Pet Period: 
Lot Sales Per Pe/iod. 
Additional Loan Draw: 
IfttanrpedJaie Loan Balance: 
Total Release Payment: 




























































































































































































































































































Quarter Quarter Quarter 






























Cumulative Lots Completed 
Average Let Prioe: 
N
**Je« per Period: 













- interest Expense; 
'aj Expenses: 
. «&umea Loan Draw: 
Net Revenue Before Release: 
Cash Flow Before Release: 
Release Payment: 
Cash Flow Aflei Release: 
Developer's Profit: 
CF After DevelProfil: $1,336,023 $1,346,427 $1,357,797 
Mortgage Schedule; 
Beginning Mortgage Balance: 
Inle/ed Expense Per Period: 


























































































































Redhawk- Nielsen Lots 
Total Lots Sold; 











Present Value of Cash Flow 
Discounted at 12.00% 
Present Value of Mortgage 
Value to Single Purchaser: 












































TOTAL INDICATED VALUE $9,430,000 
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN
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Total Lots Sold (Inc Greyhawk) 











[Present Value of Cash Flow 
;Dl5counted at 1ZC 
Present Value of Mortgage 
Value to Single Purchaser: 
Value P& Lot: 
Total 















































Summary of Assumptions 
Redhawk-MacDonald Lots 
No. of Lots 44l 
No, Periods/Year 4| 
Average base price^o! $340,500 
Sale Commission & Promotion % 7.00%| 
Closing cost per lot $250 
Periods until SeJJoul 111 
STaxflol/yaar *10 ; 
-Tiroon charges/lol/year $1,200 
Tax Rollback per Lot $10,500 i 
Developer's Overhead % 1 .00% j 
Original Loan $4,300,000 
Annual Interest rate 0.500%! 
Release % 90.00% 
Developer's Profit 12.00% 
Discount Rate 12.00% 
Annual Appreciation rate 3.00% 
Periods delay J 
Prior to appreciation 2J 
Expense Inflation Rate (Ann) 3.00% 
Tax Inflation Rate 3.00% 
Original Mortgage Balance; $4,300,000 
;gage Balance Per Lot: $97,727 
?a^e P r^flftrrf* .30%. 
trwieasa Price Per Lot: $306,450 j 
Interest Rate Per Period: 2.13% 
lungi 
t*Mort! 
HOLME ROBERTS &OWEN, LLP 
Robert L. Stolebarger, Esq. (USB# 3123) 
111 East Broadway, Suite 1 ] 00 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-5800 
Facsimile: (801) 521-9639 
Attorneys for Nielsen Redhawk, LLC 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURX 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY", STATE OF UTAH 
MACDONAJLD REDHAWK INVESTORS, 
a Utah limited parmership, 
Plaintiff, 
NIELSEN REDHAWK, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability company, and REDHAWK 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Utah limited 
company, 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION TO CONFIRM 
ARBITRATION AWARD 
Civil No. 990908761 
Judge Wilkinson 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-3la-12, MacDonald Redhawk Investors, Redhawk 
Development LLC, and Nielsen Redhawk LLC hereby stipulate and agree to confirm the 
Arbitration Award (the "Award") entered and issued by the Arbitration Panel consisting of James 
F. Holbrook, Alan V, Funk, and J. Philip Cook (the "Arbitration") on the 15th day of December, 
1999, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and hereby incorporated hr-*** ** *«"•"- > 
0 O 5 A 6 O 1 7 8K01320 P60C177 
forcgomg shall not prevent any party to the Arbitration from initiating appropriate action to 
enforce or c$mpd performance of the Award or to seek resolution of disputes in connection with 
the impjemefltertioa of the Award, including, without limitation, disputes concerning water rights, 
access rights* ^ ^ payment of obligations. 
DATED this M day of March, 2000. 
SKELL&WH-MER 
David ELcta V \ 
Attorney for MacDonald Redhawk Investors and 
ledhawk Development, LLC 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP 
Robert L. Stolebarger X 
Attorney for Nielsen Redhaw^tLC 
DO"5<£<£G 1*7 Bn0i320 PG00178 
D15TRICT COURXSAy ^ T / / ^ M ^ / f A 
Of UTAH. .'Co / 7 ?? jfi 9ffjJr&^*^ 
DATE:. 
